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A LEGAL-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF KEOGH
RETIREMENT PLAN PARTICIPATION BY FARMERS
AND OTHER SELF-EMPLOYED PERSONS +
BY DONALD R. LEvI* AND LEROY F. ROGERS**
I. INTRODUCTION
The basic purpose of this article is to report the results of a
study designed to determine and analyze the extent to which farmers
participate in self-employment retirement programs authorized by
the Internal Revenue Code,1 and to compare their participation
rates and levels with those existing in other industries. Only a
thumbnail sketch of the legal requirements for such participation
will be outlined here so that the economic implications of the
various self-employment retirement plan concepts and rules may be
identified and analyzed. This discussion of the economic component
will be followed by identification of some of the limitations of the
income tax data utilized in the study, and an analysis of the results.
II. RULES FOR PARTICIPATING IN KEOGH2 RETIREMENT
PLANS
The basic Keogh retirement plan tax treatment available to
self-employed persons is as follows. First, self-employed persons are
permitted to set aside up to (1) 10 percent of their "earned income,"
or (2) "$2,500, whichever is the lesser" into a retirement "fund."
"Earned income" encompasses that portion of net profits from a
± Scientific paper 4159, project 1955, College of Agriculture Research Center, Washington
State University, Pullman, Washington.
* Associate Professor of Agricultural Law and Associate Research Economist, Texas A
& M University, College Station, Texas; member of the Texas and Missouri Bars.
* Professor of Agricultural Economics and Agricultural Economist, Washington State
University, Pullman, Washington.
1. The Internal Revenue Code is hereinafter referred to as the Code. All references are
to the Code of 1954, as amended, unless otherwise Indicated.
2. Retirement plans for the self-employed are popularly referred to as "Keogh" plans in
recognition of Representative Eugene J. Keogh being the primary legislative sponsor.
3. Treas. Reg. § 1.404(e)-l(a) (2) (1963).
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trade or business which constitutes a reasonable allowance for per-
sonal services actually rendered.4
Second, the money placed in this fund is not subject to income
tax in the year earned, nor is any income generated by the fund
taxable when earned. Rather such monies are not taxed to the par-
ticipating individual until he receives them-usually after retire-
ment, and in no case can the distribution begin before disability5
or age 591/2,6 or after age 701/2.7
Sole proprietors establishing Keogh retirement plans must also
make contributions on behalf of full-time employees who have been
employed for three years or more. If the business has been operating
less than three years, all full-time employees must be covered who
have worked for the business as long as the sole proprietor. Em-
ployees are considered to work full-time when they work more than
20 hours per week for more than five months out of the year.8
Each employee has a nonforfeitable right to contributions made on
his behalf.,
A Keogh plan cannot discriminate in favor of the self-employed
person. This means that the percentage contribution of earned in-
come made in behalf of the self-employed person cannot exceed the
percentage contribution made on behalf of an employee on the basis
of his wages earned. 10
However, the contributions on behalf of employees required to
avoid discrimination may be somewhat less than they first appear
because of the possibility of "integrating" Keogh plans with social
security. Such integration is available for self-employed plans cover-
ing owner-employees if the contributions made on behalf of the
owner-employees do not exceed one-third of all contributions." In
that case, social security taxes made on behalf of employees by
employers may be subtracted from the employee contribution re-
quired to avoid discrimination, and the Federal Insurance Contri-
butions Act' 2 self-employment tax is likewise subtracted from the
owner-employee's contribution. 3
There are actually four different types of "funds" into which
Keogh contributions may be paid (either individually or in corn-
4. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-10(c)(3)" (1963).
5. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-12(m)(1) (1968): see § 1.72-17(f) (1971) for the definition
of "disabled".
6. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-12(m) (1) (1968); see also Rev. Rul. 65-21, 1965-1 CuM. BULL.
174.
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-11(e) (2) (1968). This limitation does not apply to United States
Retirement Bonds.
8. Treas. Reg, § 1.401-12(e) (1968).
9. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-12(g) (1968).
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-12(f) (1968).
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-12(h) (1968).
12. Hereinafter referred to as the FICA.
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-12(h) (1968).
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bination). They are: (1) a trust, with a bank as trustee; (2) a
custodial account, with a bank as custodian; (3) U. S. Retirement
Plan Bonds; and (4) insurance contracts. In addition, other methods
of funding may be approved by the Internal Revenue Service.14 If a
self-employed individual utilizes more than one of these alternatives,
his total contribution to all funding media still cannot exceed the
10 percent or $2,500 maximum limitation.
The trust can use the Keogh contributions and make essentially
any kind of investment it chooses, including such investments as
stocks and bonds, mutual funds, real estate, etc. Moreover, it is
possible for the self-employed individual to retain control over the
investment of trust funds. 5
Custodial accounts can only be invested in mutual funds or in-
surance contracts, while the latter may involve both fixed and
variable annuity contracts. United States Retirement Plan Bonds
currently bear interest at the rate of five percent compounded semi-
annually, but only earned 4.15 percent compounded semi-annually in
1968.16
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Income earning resources (capital) of individuals may be divided
into two distinct categories-human and nonhuman capital. 1 7 The
magnitude and proportion of each capital category held by a given
person, ceteris paribus, potentially has a profound influence on both
his ability to retire at a specified age and his standard of living
after retirement.
Those who hold primarily human capital (i.e., employees) have
relatively fewer income-earning resources on which to rely during
retirement. Indeed, in the absence of private or public planning
(e.g., private savings and retirement programs, social security) such
individuals may be unable to retire because income is insufficient
to sustain the necessities of life. The plight of these individuals has
been recognized for some time, as illustrated by the special tax
treatment given employee retirement plans in and since the Code of
1939.
Self-employed persons whose income is derived primarily from
personal services (e.g., architects, accountants) constitute another
group of individuals arguably in a similar position to employees.
The composition of their capital also is mostly human in nature, so
in theory they potentially face essentially the same income problems
14. Hereinafter referred to as the Service.
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-12(c)(3) (1968).
16. The yeae for which the Service provided the income tax data utilized in the study.
17. As used herein, the term "nonhuman capital" includes land and all physical resources
employed in production processes or enterprises.
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with increasing age. 8 In recognition of their allegedly analogous
position, somewhat similar retirement plan treatment for self-
employed persons was added to the Code by 1962 legislation.1 9 In
popular usage, these self-employed retirement plans are now re-
ferred to as "Keogh plans."
Finally, 196620 and 196821 amendments made Keogh more at-
tractive to potential participants and extended similar treatment to
self-employed individuals for whom (nonhuman) capital is a ma-
terial income-producing factor (e.g., farmers). This together with
potential social security benefits, has substantially broadened re-
tirement alternatives for persons in this category. Since, by defini-
tion, they have a higher proportion of nonhuman to human capital
than employees and other self-employed persons (i.e., nonhuman
capital is a material income-producing factor for this class of the
self-employed), they also have one additional retirement alternative-
that of living on their assets. Even so, the equity argument of equal
treatment was substantially responsible for extending identical
Keogh coverage to this class of taxpayers.
Prior to 1967, Keogh was comparatively unattractive to those
self-employed individuals for whom capital was a material income-
producing factor, primarily because they could treat only 30 per-
cent of their net profit as earned income. Therefore, in order to
establish an attractive retirement plan, many individuals simply in-
corporated their businesses and had the corporation set up a retire-
ment plan which covered them in their status as a corporate em-
ployee. Thus, in effect, the previously cited 1966 legislation 22 author-
ized essentially identical retirement plan coverage for both cor-
porations and sole proprietors.
With the advent of state legislation (roughly a decade ago)
authorizing professional (personal service) corporations, many self-
employed people whose income came primarily from personal serv-
ices (e.g., doctors, lawyers) were also incorporating and setting up
corporate employee retirement plans. To them this was a more
attractive alternative than Keogh, simply because one could deduct
only one-half of his contributions to a Keogh plan prior to this same
1966 legislation. 2 Thus, in a very real sense the net effect of the
1966 and 1968 amendments 24 was to neutralize the form of business
organization with respect to retirement plans.
18. Although perhaps to a lesser degree.
19. Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, Pub.L. No. 87-792, 76 Stat. 809.
20. Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, Pub.L. No. 89-809, tit II, § 204, 80 Stat. 1577.
21. Act of Oct. 21, 1968, Pub.L. No. 90-607, 82 Stat. 1189.
22. Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, Pub.L. No. 89-809, tit. II, § 204, 80 Stat. 1577.
23. Id.
24. Act of Oct. 21, 1968, Pub.L. No. 90-607, 82 Stat. 1189; Foreign Investors Tax Act of
1966, Pub.L. No. 89-809, tit. II, § 204, 80 Stat. 1577.
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III. GENERAL ECONOMIC CONCEPTS UNDERLYING SELF-
EMPLOYED RETIREMENT PROGRAMS
The tax savings occurring under Keogh plan participation es-
sentially constitute a subsidy being paid to participants for purchas-
ing units of retirement income. The basic idea behind any subsidy
is that the payment thereof will cause people or firms to change
their production or consumption patterns to more closely conform
to the perceived social optima. The subsidy payment (in this case
to consumers) changes the effective price of the goods in question
(i.e., units of retirement income). In a theoretical sense, the subsidy
is being paid to correct a market imperfection (e.g., perhaps caused
by imperfect information about retirement alternatives) by increas-
ing purchases of units of retirement income.
To the extent that Keogh participation merely postpones payment
of taxes until income is actually received (usually after retirement),
it can be viewed as an interest-free loan from the government in
the amount of the deferred taxes. This portion of the Keogh subsidy
is best characterized as a credit subsidy, with the benefit realized
being that of simple deferral.
However, because other income will likely be lower and ex-
emptions and deductions higher when Keogh funds are distributed,
the total taxes paid may be less than with nonparticipation. To this
extent, participation in Keogh is equivalent to a tax subsidy. In
total then, the subsidy enjoyed by participation is conceptually the
sum of two distinctly different types of subsidies.
A. GAINERS AND LOSERS UNDER KEOGH
There are gainers and losers with almost any governmental
policy or program. The obvious losers as a result of Keogh are those
taxpayers whose relative share of the total tax burden is increased.
The obvious gainers are the self-employed individuals who partici-
pate (presumably none lose by participation; otherwise, assuming
perfect knowledge, they would not participate).
However, depending on the price effects, or incidence, there may
be others who share substantially in the benefit from the subsidy.
Here the impact of a subsidy should be distinguished from its
incidence. The impact refers to whom the subsidy is paid, which
in this case are the self-employed purchasing units of retirement
income. The incidence, on the other hand, refers to the ultimate
division of the subsidy.
Congress is certain of the incidence at the time it authorizes
the subsidy. But on occasion it may badly misjudge the ultimate
division of the subsidy and unintended results may occur. Ignoring
the secondary beneficiaries of the increased spending resulting from
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Keogh over time (i.e., the "multiplier" effect), the initial distribu-
tion of the Keogh subsidy can be theoretically determined by the
following ratio:
Elasticity of supply25  Buyer benefit
Elasticity of demand Seller benefit
where the buyers are the self-employed purchasing units of retire-
ment income and the sellers of same are the life insurance com-
panies, mutual fund companies, Treasury Department, and purvey-
ors of other investment alternatives permitted under the law. These
sellers clearly gain from Keogh, as do the secondary beneficiaries
with whom the sellers are able to do business because of their
Keogh sales.
A redistribution of income often results from' governmental pro-
grams, and such is likely the case with Keogh. This redistribution
may favor specific income levels, occupations, or geographical re-
gions. One of the objectives of this study was to identify how this
redistribution has occurred by identifying participants by income
level, industry and family size.
B. JUSTIFICATION OF KEOGH
A major justification of Keogh is that it corrected "indefensible
discrimination against self-employed persons. ' 26 Though not within
the purview of the current research, if the self-employed have a
higher level of nonhuman capital available for use during retire-
ment than do employees, whether the alleged discrimination is in-
deed "indefensible" appears subject to serious question.
Viewed from the traditional employer-tax deductibility stand-
point, it is clear that retirement plan contributions made on behalf
of employees, whether Keogh or employee plans, would be deduct-
ible in the absence of retirement plan provisions on the theory they
are an "ordinary and necessary" business expense.2 7 The same is
not true, however, for Keogh contributions made on behalf of self-
employed persons. Thus, from the standpoint of what traditionally
has been considered to be a properly deductible expense, only the
contributions for the self-employed appear susceptible of being class-
ified as concessionary in nature.
A second justification sometimes advanced in favor of retire-
ment plans in general is based in equity and states simply that the
fairest tax system is one which spreads taxable income evenly
25. The elasticities of supply and demand are used by economists to measure the respon-
siveness of the changes in quantities placed on and purchased from the market when given
changes in price occur. The data required to compute them was not available in this study.
26. R. L. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 116 (1964).
27. Goetz, The Myth of Special Tax Concessions for Qualified Pension Plans, 51 IOWA L.
REv. 561 (1966).
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throughout a taxpayer's lifetime.28 This argument is analogous to
the one supportive of the Code income averaging provisions, 29 rec-
ognizing that under the progressive system those with large varia-
tions in income generally pay larger total taxes over time than those
with constant (but equal average) income.
The soundness of the income-spreading principle is recognized
in many countries both for private contributory retirement plans0
and for national compulsory old-age pension plans.3 1
There appears to be at least one, perhaps substantial, counter-
argument to the above noted support of the income-spreading prin-
ciple. Simply stated, given that spreading income more or less
equally over one's lifetime will minimize his total tax bill as com-
pared to one with more extreme variations in income, taxation under
income-spreading does not necessarily correspond with ability to pay.
Rather, if total income taxed in low income years is below the
level of disposable income required to cover necessities, participation
in Keogh may cause substantial hardships to some individuals. This
very situation could well exist after retirement.
C. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL
DECISION TO AUTHORIZE KEOGH PLANS
One could construct a logical economic argument3 2 that the Con-
gressional implementation of Keogh plans for the self-employed
could be interpreted as implying the following.
First, the selection for subsidization of this group of people oc-
curred only after identifying and evaluating the benefits and costs
associated with subsidization of other groups. The welfare implica-
tions of various legislative alternatives should be recognized, since
different people and groups may be gainers or losers under each
alternative course of action.
Second, once the decision was made to subsidize self-employed
persons' participation in retirement plans, the efficiency of the al-
ternative subsidy delivery mechanisms should be examined. Again,
it should also be recognized that different persons and groups may
be gainers- or losers when different delivery mechanisms are em-
ployed.
28. Peterson, Federal Taxation in Relation to Lifetime Income Spreading and the Com-
plementary Roles of the Public and Private Retirement Programs, TAX FOUNDATION'S 18TH
NATIONAL CONFERENCE, pt. II (1967).
29. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 §§ 1301-1305.
30. Including Canada, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
See note 28 supra, at 14.
31. Including Austria. Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom. Hasenberg, Income Tax Treatment of Old Age Pensions Here and Abroad,
29-8 SOCIAL SECURITY BULL. 10 (1966).
32. Perhaps it might be more proper to class this as an "idealistic argument".
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Additionally, the government is faced with the problem of deter-
mining the optimal level of the subsidy. In the unconstrained case,
basic economic theory tells us this should be at the level where
marginal benefits equal marginal costs (providing marginal costs
are increasing). However, in practice this may present a problem
which may have to be solved somewhat arbitrarily, simply because
an individual's decision to participate logically will be based on his
own marginal benefits and costs rather than those of the government.
At the government level, three potential categories of Keogh
associated costs can be identified. One is the budgetary cost. It is
related to the decrease in current taxes resulting from participation
in Keogh (this includes tax decreases associated with current de-
ductions for participation plus the taxes avoided on nontaxable in-
come generated by Keogh "funds").a3 Here the cost to the govern-
ment is the cost of borrowing such decrease in tax revenues, or the
bond rate multiplied by the decrease in tax revenue.84
A second governmental cost is the administrative cost of deliver-
ing the subsidy. Here the basic consideration is the cost of additional
Internal Revenue Service personnel requirements for administering
Keogh.
Finally, participation in Keogh isolates monies in the retirement
fund which are not available for use by the business firm, and the
unavailability of this money (together with the inability to borrow)
may prevent the firm from attaining additional economies of size
and higher taxable incomes in future years. To the extent Keogh
participation does cause inefficient resource utilization and lower
taxable income, the government may incur an additional cost in the
form of decreased tax revenues in future years. Consumers likewise
may suffer here, if the higher costs associated with inefficient re-
source utilization under Keogh participation are passed on to them
in the form of higher product and consumer goods prices.
In theory, of course, it is clear that an individual participant
could reach a higher level of satisfaction with a cash grant than
with the subsidy paid for participation in Keogh.85 However, com-
munity satisfaction may be higher with Keogh than with the cash
grant, at least to the extent we are willing to assume that Congres-
sional action and our political system accurately reflect community
desires.
33. Since Keogh participants are purchasing units of retirement income and the purchase
thereof constitutes Income to the sellers of same, and since such sellers may spend a por-
tion thereof buying goods and services from secondary beneficiaries, it is questionable
whether a net budgetary cost actually results from Keogh.
34. Note that this cost need not equal the benefit to participants, the credit subsidy por-
tion of which is based on the individual's cost of borrowing.
35. Simply stated, this is because the individual is free to buy whatever goods he chooses
with a cash grant, but in order to get the Keogh subsidy he must purchase a particular
good (unit of retirement income) which may have less personal utility to him than some
other goods.
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D. THE INDIVIDUAL DECISION TO PARTICIPATE
As previously alluded to, the self-employed individual's decision
regarding Keogh participation should be made only after determining
that total benefits of participation are greater than or equal to total
cost thereof. Ideally, the level at which he participates should be
determined by equating marginal benefits and marginal costs.3 6
The major benefits to the individual Keogh participant include:
1. Deferral of tax liability until future years. As previously
noted, this essentially constitutes an interest-free loan to
the self-employed participant, a measure of the benefit of
which is the interest rate at which the participant can
borrow.
2. Complete or partial avoidance of tax liability. This may
result because of additional deductions and/or exemptions
available after age 65, and because the absence of other
income makes Keogh distributions subject to lower mar-
ginal rates of taxation.
3. Another benefit, although not readily susceptible to quanti-
fication, is the personal satisfaction an individual may en-
joy because he believes he has adequate income (in com-
bination with other sources) for retirement security.
Some costs which the self-employed individual may incur by
reason of Keogh participation include:
1. Inefficient resource utilization with the firm, to the extent
that participation takes away funds from the firm neces-
sary for the achievement of additional economies of size.37
2. Participation may deny the opportunity to make additional,
and in some cases more lucrative, extra-firm investments.
3. Participation may so diminish disposable income so as to
require either a decrease in, or borrowing for, current
consumption.
E. SOME SPECIFIC KEOGH CONCEPTS AND RULES
1. Coverage of Employees 8s
As previously noted, a Keogh plan must include employer con-
36. In practice, this basic theoretical principle may be difficult to apply because some
costs and benefits are hard to identify and quantify.
37. Note however that participation essentially constitutes forced capital accumulation.
To the extent that such capital accumulation is required for investment, to the extent that
investment is required for economic growth, and to the extent that economic growth is de-
sired, participation may have important macro implications.
88. While the study being reported was designed to examine and compare Keogh plans
covering employees with plans not covering employees, the results thereof were not avail-
able when this manuscript was being prepared. Thus, the theoretical expectations are dis-
cussed here, and those readers interested In the actual results of this portion of the study
may direct their Inquiries to the authors.
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tributions on behalf of all employees who have been employed three
years or more or, if less than three years, have been employed
as long as the self-employed persons covered by the plan. Since the
law prohibits lowering an employee's salary near or after the time
he becomes eligible for coverage, the initial effect of including em-
ployees in the plan will be to increase production costs of the
business firm. Presumably, to the extent that employee wages may
be increased less than proportionately to gains achieved by other
laborers outside the firm, over time it may be possible for this
cost to be passed on to the employee.3 9
Thus, to the extent that Keogh does increase production costs,
the firm may be placed in a disadvantageous position with respect
to competition with other firms, depending on the competitive nature
of the industry and the price elasticity of demand for its output.
If it is a monopolist or oligopolist, it may, of course, be able to pass
on to its customers a portion of these increased production costs.
If a perfect competitor, in theory this increased production cost
could be sufficient to force exit from the industry. The price elastic-
ity of demand, of course, is important because it measures respon-
siveness of quantities taken as price changes. If the demand is elastic
and prices increase as hypothesized, total revenue will decrease and
the profit position of the firm will worsen.
With respect to the changing labor environment being faced by
agricultural firms, Keogh also may be viewed as an additional em-
ployee benefit brought about by modern society, and moreover sim-
ply as another cost of doing business. From a theoretical standpoint,
since Keogh causes an increase in the cost of (covered) labor, the
firm would be expected to decrease the quantity of labor hired.
2. Vesting of Retirement Plan Benefits in Employees
The law provides that all contributions made on behalf of em-
ployees are vested in them. That is, if they leave their current em-
ployment, they are still entitled to the retirement benefits enuring
because of contributions made on their behalf. Therefore, as compar-
ed to the alternative of nonvested rights, the effect of Keogh is to
increase the mobility of labor, thereby permitting it to flow more
freely to its highest and best use.
From the standpoint of the firm (self-employed individual), no
doubt a preference would exist, if allowed by law, to cover only the
highly-skilled employees, using a nonvested plan. This would give
39. This may not be universally true. Some employees may insist on a certain minimum
take-home pay, regardless of the size of the Keogh contribution being made on their behalf,
because they have a strong need or preference for current consumption. To the extent this
preference predominates in the labor market, it may be possible to pass only a portion of
the cost of employee coverage to the employees themselves.
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such employees an incentive to stay with the firm, and would help
assure that the firm did not incur the costs of training employees who
would then accept employment elsewhere.
However, Keogh prevents such preferential treatment of highly
skilled employees, and specifically requires that all employee Keogh
rights be vested. Thus, the firm must look elsewhere for incentives
to assist in the retention of employees.
F. INTEGRATION OF KEOGH WITH SOCIAL SECURITY
As noted earlier, Keogh plans may be integrated with social se-
curity if the annual contributions made on behalf of the self-employ-
ed do not exceed one-third of all contributions (i.e., those made for
self-employed persons plus those made for employees). In that case,
while the discrimination rules prohibit making a smaller percentage
contribution for employees than for the self-employed (technically
called) "owner-employees," employer social security payments on be-
half of employees may be considered a part of such percentage con-
tribution (self-employed contributions must also be adjusted for
FICA).
As a practical matter, the one-third of total contributions maxi-
mum limitation tends to bias Keogh participation toward opposite
ends of the continuum. At one end is the firm which has no covered
employees; at the other end is the firm (or industry) which is rel-
atively labor intensive and for which the potential of integration with
social security lowers (or in some cases completely avoids) the costs
of employee coverage. The firms whose cost structures are increas-
ed most by the requirement of employee coverage are those which
have covered employees, but whose labor force is too small to per-
mit integration with social security.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between (1) the costs of
covering the minimum number of employees required to permit in-
tegration, and (2) the level of earned income of the self-employed
person for the years 1968, 1973, and 1987.40 The point at which the
curves intersect the horizontal axis indicate the level of earned in-
come required to achieve a zero net cost for covering employees
under integrated plans.
The actual Keogh contribution made on behalf of a self-employ-
ed person under an integrated plan will be less than $2,500 because
of the FICA adjustment as shown in Table 1. This forced decrease
level of Keogh participation constitutes another cost to him, the mag-
nitude of which depends on the differential in returns between par-
40. Respectively, the year for which the income tax data used in the study were ob-
tained, the current year, and the first year for which the highest rates now set by law will
apply.
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Figure 1. Employer cost of covering the minimum number of em-
ployees required for intergrating Keogh plans with social
security.*
ticipation and nonparticipation. The decrease in actual participation
levels over time is caused by (1) the increase in social security
rates,, and (2) the increase in the base income to which social se-
curity taxes apply.
G. INVESTMENT ALTERNATIVES
As previously noted, several alternative investments may be
made with Keogh contributions, including life insurance, U.S. Re-
tirement Plan Bonds, mutual funds, and/or general investments. As
*The assumptions behind this figure are that each employee's salary equals the maximum
wage to which social security taxes apply, and that the self-employed Individual makes themaximum possible Keogh contribution on his own bh4,1 ($2,500).
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one would expect, those yielding the highest returns generally have
a higher degree of risk associated with them.41 Those viewing Keogh
as a source of retirement security will probably prefer the lower
but relatively certain returns, while those viewing it as another in-
vestment alternative may prefer to take greater risks. Since one
need not retire to receive Keogh benefits (they begin at the age des-
ignated in the plan, regardless of the fact of retirement), many may
use Keogh as a deferral enabling investment.
IV. NATURE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE DATA
The Data used in the study being reported on were tabulated un-
der special contract with the Internal Revenue Service from their
records of 1968 sole proprietor income tax returns. The Service did
not furnish either actual returns or totals of actual returns. Rather,
in order to avoid disclosure and for practical reasons associated
with data retrieval costs, the data they provided were sample esti-
mates of population totals.
Table 1. Acutal self-employed Keogh contributions under integrated
plans for selected years.
Maximum allowable Employer social Actual Keogh
Year Keogh contribution* security taxt contribution
1968 $2,500 $ 452 $2,048
1973 2,500 794 1,706
1987 2,500 906 1,594
*Earned income is assumed $25,000.
tRounded to the nearest dollar.
In interpreting the results of any study, it is essential to recog-
nize any inherent limitations of the data. Thus, some salient facts
about the data will be briefly outlined here.
The Service only sampled returns filed by sole proprietors.
Thus, individuals operating their businesses as either partnerships
or corporations were excluded from the study.
In order to facilitate comparisons of various taxpayer groups,
data were obtained for each of the following industries:
1. farming;
2. other agriculture, forestry and fisheries;
3. mining;
4. general construction;
5. manufacturing;
41. Stubblefield, The Keogh Act, A Farmer's Retirement Plan, 1969 (unpublished M.S.
thesis at University of Missouri).
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6. transportation;
7. wholesale and retail trade;
8. finance, insurance and real estate;
9. services; and
10. all-industry totals.
To the extent possible, the Service used 1967 Office of Management
and Budget standard industrial classifications as guidelines in de-
lineating industries. 42 Where a specific tax schedule contained ac-
tivities in more than one industry, the entire schedule was classified
in the industry showing the largest percentage of total receipts.4"
Information about specific combinations of industries was not re-
corded.
The data for each industry was stratified on the basis of adjust-
ed gross income, using five different income levels as well as one
strata for nontaxable returns. Within each strata, data were obtain-
ed on certain measurable characteristics of individual taxpayers, in-
cluding adjusted gross income, taxable income, total deductions,
number of exemptions, and amount of self-employed retirement de-
duction. This information was derived for both Keogh participants
and non-participants.
The majority of the data was obtained from the Service-recorded
aggregated responses found on Form 2950SE, with additional infor-
mation coming from Form 1040 and Schedules C and F. Here it
should be noted that only "pension or annuity" type plans were
covered'; and Service did not record data about profit sharing plans.
V. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
A. COMPARISONS OF TOTAL RETURNS FILED
In 1968, sole proprietors44 filed 8,473,586 returns, of which
6,523,597 were taxable. From the standpoint of returns filed, farm-
ers constituted the largest sole proprietor industry, filing 2,789,469
total and 1,886,994 taxable returns.
With respect to total taxable returns, Table 2 shows that farm-
ers and services filed almost identical proportions, with 28.93 and
28.83 per cent, respectively. Wholesale and retail trade was the only
other industry in two-digit figures, with 21.19 per cent.
As illustrated in Table 2, farming had a relatively large propor-
tion of total sole proprietor returns at lower adjusted gross income
42. STATISTICS OF INCOME 1968-BusINESS INCOME TAX RETURNS, DEP'T OF TREASURY, IN-
TERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUD. No. 438 (1-72), 253 (1969).
48. Id.
44. It is emphasized that this study only involved sole proprietors. No data was obtained
on partnerships, or on either subchapter C or S corporations. This should be kept in mind
when interpreting the results.
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(AGI), with such proportion decreasing as income increased. This
trend held true until reaching the highest AGI level examined
($50,000 and over), at which point the proportion of returns filed by
farmers increased slightly to 15.48 per cent.
It is interesting to contrast the relative proportion of returns
filed by the services industry with that filed by farms (see Table
2). Services progressively increased their share from 23.95 per cent
of the lowest positive AGI level to 55.70 per cent where AGI was
$50,000 or more. Attorneys, doctors, and other professional people
are, of course, a part of the services industry.
Table 2. Percent* of total returns filed by various income levels,
by industry.
Total AGI AGI AGI AGI AGI Non-
taxable less than $10,000- $17,500- $25,000- $50,000 taxable
returns $10,000 17,499 24 999 49,999 or more returns
Farms 28.93 34.32 24.60 15.98 12.61 15.48 34.32
Other agriculture,
forestry & fisheries 1.77 1.91 1.75 1.35 1.13 1.22 1.91
Mining .40 .20 .33 .67 1.28 3.73 .20
General construction 7.84 9.04 7.12 5.40 3.55 2.30 9.04
Manufacturing 1.90 1.67 2.18 2.41 2.30 2.08 1.67
Transportation 2.92 3.25 2.98 1.85 1.29 .92 3.25
Wholesale & retail trade 21.19 21.16 23.01 20.88 17.28 10.39 21.16
Finance, insurance
& real estate 6.23 4.50 7.83 11.73 9.72 8.18 4.50
Services 28.83 23.95 30.21 39.73 50.84 55.70 23.95
*May not total to 100 because of rounding.
Finally, farmers filed 34.32 per cent of the 1968 nontaxable sole
proprietor returns. Services ranked second in this category, with
23.95 per cent.
B. COMPARISONS OF TOTAL KEOGH RETURNS FILED
Of the total returns filed by sole proprietors in 1968, 2.90 per-
cent participated in Keogh. Relative industry Keogh participation
rates for various AGI levels can be found in Table 3. It shows that
the services industry is by far the biggest Keogh participant, filing
62.30 per cent of all taxable Keogh returns and 86.81 per cent of all
such returns reporting AGI of $50,000 or more.
Farms, on the other hand, only filed 9.48 per cent of taxable
Keogh returns, and only 3.87 per cent of those with $50,000 or more
AGI. This huge differential between farms and services occurred
despite the fact that their relative proportions of total taxable re-
turns (Keogh and non-Keogh) were almost precisely equal (28.93 per
cent for farms, 28.83 per cent for services, as set out in Table 2).
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A plausible explanation for this disparagement is that people in
the services industries, as compared to farmers, have more perfect
knowledge about tax provisions potentially beneficial to them. This
premise has particular appeal for that portion of the services in-
dustry composed of attorneys and accountants.
In addition, Table 3 clearly shows that a relatively larger pro-
portion of total Keogh participants are composed of farmers at low
rather than high AGI levels. The exact opposite pattern is observed
with respect to services.
C. ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME
Table 4 compares the mean level of adjusted gross income (AGI)
per taxable return4 5 for Keogh participants and nonparticipants, by
industry. For total taxable returns, the mean AGI level was decided-
ly higher for Keogh farm participants than nonparticipants ($19,540
v. $9,600) and this same pattern was observed in all other industries.
This is to be expected, since those with lower incomes must of neces-
sity use a larger proportion of their income for current family con-
sumption.
Table 3. Per cent* of Keogh returns filed per industry by income
level.
Total AGI AGI AGI AGI AGI Non-
taxable less than $10,000- $17.500- $25,000- $50,000 taxable
returns $10,000 17,499 24;.999 49,999 or more returns
Farms 9.48 20.88 17.48 7.27 3.69 3.87 48.29
Other agriculture,
forestry & fisheries 1.81 3.07 2.12 3.05 1.03 .66 0.0
Mining .22 0.0 .21 .17 .11 .68 .05
General Construction 2.75 9.69 3.41 2.08 .91 .26 1.84
Manufacturing .98 1.23 1.98 .68 .76 .32 2.33
Transportation .77 1.51 1.71 1.02 .11 .11 3.88
Wholsale & retail trade 14.69 20.94 23.59 18.39 10.36 3.94 14.93
Finance, insurance,
& real estate 6.99 6.42 9.40 10.47 5.97 3.35 1.98
Services 62.30 36.26 40.10 56.86 77.07 86.81 26.75
*May not total to 100 because of rounding.
With respect to participants, the farm mean AGI level ranked
seventh among the nine industries examined, and was some $12,000
below the mean for all industries. Farms also ranked seventh among
nonparticipants, with their mean AGI of $9,600 falling roughly $1,900
below the mean for all industries.
Mining had far and above the highest mean AGI levels for both
45. Note that these are the means for taxable returns only; the means would be decidedly
lower if all returns (including those which were nontaxable) were analyzed.
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Table 4. Mean adjusted gross income* per return and relative rank
for Keogh participants and nonparticipants, by industry,
for total taxable returns.
Participants Rank Nonparticipants Rank
Farms $19,540 7 $ 9,600 7
Other agriculture, forestry
& fisheries 21,860 4 10,410 6
Mining 73,230 1 43,100 1
General construction 14,550 9 9,330 9
Manufacturing 20,800 6 12,830 4
Transportation 14,890 8 9,510 8
Wholesale & retail trade 21,200 5 10,830 5
Finance, insurance
& real estate 25,560 3 14,810 2
Services 37,740 2 13,560 3
All industries 31,540 11,470
*Rounded to nearest ten dollars.
participants and nonparticipants ($73,230 v. $43,100), indicating that
the few sole proprietors involved in mining have relatively large in-
comes.
Table 5 contains the AGI share ratios for Keogh participants, by
industry. A share ratio just tells whether participants received more
or less than their proportional share of industry AGI. A value greater
than one indicates receipt of greater than a proportionate share, while
the opposite holds true for a value less than one. 4"
Computed participants' share ratios were greater than one in
all industries until the $25,000 AGI level was reached, where the
Table 5. Adjusted gross income
participants, by income
industry share ratios for Keogh
Total AGI AGI A:GI AGI AGI Non-
taxable less than $10,000- $17,600- $25,000- $50,000 taxable
returns $10,000 17,499 24,999 49,999 Or more returns
Farms 2.02 1.19 1.06 1.00 1.03 .68 3.29
Other agriculture,
forestry & fisheries 2.03 1.06 1.23 1.04 1.02 .70 -
Mining 1.68 0.0 1.18 1.16 1.18 .69 -
General construction 1.55 1.30 1.01 1.02 1.03 .97 2.02
Manufacturing 1.61 1.08 1.03 1.00 .93 .86 5.08
Transportation 1.56 1.07 1.06 1.00 .96 .69 4.30
Wholesale & retail trade 1.92 1.22 1.07 1.03 .99 .92 3.84
Finance, insurance
& real estate 1.69 1.21 1.07 1.01 1.02 .83 14.66
Services 2.50 1.21 1.04 1.03 1.06 .89 3.27
All industries 2.62 1.22 1.06 1.03 1.06 .81 3.72
46. For example, in an industry with ten percent of its taxpayers participating in Keogh,
if such participants claim ten percent of the industry AGI, they receive exactly their pro-
portionate share and have a share ratio of one.
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share ratios of manufacturing, transportation, and wholesale and re-
tail trade fell below one. Moreover, share ratios were less than one
for each and every industry when the $50,000 AGI level was reached,
indicating that the mean AGI level of nonparticipants was exceeding
that of participants.
Since the theoretical Keogh participation advantages generally
increase with increasing income,47 the fact that participants' AGI
share ratios are less than one at high income levels may have im-
portant implications. One possible explanatory hypothesis here is
that this taxpayer group generally tends to expect long-run non-
Keogh investment after-tax returns to -exceed Keogh investment after-
tax returns. This hypothesis has particular appeal where indivisibil-
ities and institutional impediments are associated with non-Keogh
investments which enjoy economies of size. 48
D. TAXABLE INCOME
The 1968 mean level of taxable income (TI) per sole proprietor
taxable return49 can be found in Table 6. The relative rankings for
mean TI are quite similar to those for mean AGI, with farms again
ranking seventh of the nine industries examined for both partici-
pants and nonparticipants. Mean farm participants' TI was $15,000,
while nonparticipants' mean TI was only $6,270. These means were
again below those for all industries, which were, respectively, $24,600
and $7,610.
E. PERSONAL EXEMPTIONS
The mean number of exemptions per return was used in the
study as a proxy for family size. As shown in Table 7, there would
appear to be no substantial variations among industries with respect
to participants filing taxable returns, or for nonparticipants filing
either taxable or nontaxable returns.
However, to the extent that the number of exemptions are a
valid proxy for family size, several industries were characterized by
relatively larger families with respect to Keogh participants filing
nontaxable returns. For farmers participating in Keogh, the mean
number of exemptions per taxable and nontaxable returns were,
respectivelly, 3.6,0 and 5.49. This suggests that family size may be
an important variable in reducing taxable income for farmers par-
ticipating in Keogh.
An interesting pattern also emerges when one compares the
47. Because the differential between marginal taxation rates before and after retirement
would be anticipated to be grea test for income taxpayers.
48. In its simplest form "economies of size" just means that large firms may by their
nature have cost and profit advantages over smaller firms.
49. See note 45 supra.
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Table 6. Mean taxable income* per return and relative rank for
Keogh participants and nonparticipants, by industry, for
total taxable returns.
Participants Rank Nonparticipants Rank
Farms 15,000 7 6,270 7
Other agriculture,
forestry & fisheries 16,550 4 6,590 6
Mining 56,960 1 32,500 1
General construction 10,290 9 5,700 9
Manufacturing 15,700 6 8,830 4
Transportation 10,710 8 5,970 8
Wholesale & retail trade 16,160 5 7,080 5
Finance, insurance &
real estate 19,330 3 9,990 2
Services 29,800 2 9,260 3
All industries 24,600 7,610
*Rounded to nearest ten dollars.
mean number of exemptions per taxable return by income level (see
Table 8). In most industries the mean number of exemptions (family
size) per return increases with increasing income. This is particular-
ly true in the services industry, where an increase in number of
exemptions is observed at each successively higher income level. One
can posit an interesting hypothesis for this general relationship-
that, at least where taxable returns are involved, perhaps those
with higher incomes believe they can support larger families and
therefore have more children. The ages of taxpayers may also be
Table 7. Mean number of exemptions per return and relative rank
for Keogh participants and nonparticipants, by industry,
for total taxable and nontaxable returns.
Participants Nonparticipants
Taxable Rank Nontaxable Rank Taxable Rank Nontaxable Rank
Farms 3.60 7 5.49 2 3.28 9 3.70 4
Other agriculture,
forestry & fisheries 3.90 3 .19* 9 3.45 4 3.57 5T
Mining 3.82 4 5.00 3 3.51 1 3.57 5T
General construction 3.80 5 2.08 8 3.50 2 3.90 2
Manufacturing 3.96 2 3.54 6 3.40 6 3.72 3
Transportation 3.45 9 4.00 5 3.44 5 3.93 1
Wholesale & retail
trade 3.59 8 4.19 4 3.38 7 3.38 7T
Finance, insurance
& real estate 3.64 6 6.12 1 3.48 3 3.38 7T
Services 4.05 1 3.38 7 3.34 8 3.34 9
All industries 3.90 4.58 3.36 3.58
*One explanation of this illogical mean exemption level is that the estimate was dealing
with extremely small numbers in this industry.
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important in explaining this relationship. For example, the lowest
income level may well contain relatively large numbers of very old
and very young families which are small in size.
Table 8. Mean number of exemptions per return for Keogh partici-
pants and nonparticipants, by industry and adjusted gross
income level.
AGI
less than
$10,000
AGI
$10,000-
17,499
AGI
$17,500-
24,999
AGI
$25,000-
49,999
AGI
$50,000
or more
p* NPt p* NPt p* NPt p* NPt p* NPt
Farms 2.91 3.10 3.57 3.77 4.28 3.62 4.15 3.73 4.65 3.73
Other agriculture,
forestry & fisheries 1.60 3.21 4.00 3.88 4.88 3.78 4.90 4.40 5.31 4.10
Mining 3.13 2.83 2.00 3.80 5.00 3.87 4.15 3.84 4.08 3.76
General
construction 3.27 3.22 4.57 4.11 3.95 4.17 4.33 4.05 4.52 3.93
Manufacturing 5.00 3.08 3.44 3.83 4.49 3.74 3.82 3.64 3.72 3.54
Transportation 2.19 3.26 4.02 3.75 4.10 3.95 2.72 4.05 3.53 3.68
Wholesale & retail
trade 3.17 3.13 3.61 3.79 3.68 3.73 3.78 3.77 3.92 3.69
Finance, insurance
& real estate 1.96 3.12 3.89 3.72 3.81 3.80 3.94 3.83 4.03 3.84
Services 2.65 2.89 3.29 3.70 3.84 3.87 4.28 4.15 4.72 4.15
All industries 2.82 3.07 3.54 3.78 3.88 3.81 4.20 3.97 4.65 3.93
*Participants.
tNonparticipants.
Of the 50 paired participation-nonparticipation exemption tax-
able return observations shown in Table 8, only in 17 instances do
the mean number of exemptions of nonparticipants exceed those of
participants. Twelve of such observations fall in the two income
classes (20 observations) below $17,500. One could hypothesize this
illustrates that more of the large families at lower income levels
need all of their income for current consumption, and therefore do
not choose to participate in Keogh.
In most instances, whether looking at participants or nonpartici-
pants, the mean number of exemptions claimed by farmers appears
to approach the mean computed for all industries.
F. AMOUNT OF SELF-EMPLOYMENT RETIREMENT DEDUCTION
The mean amount of the self-employment retirement deductions,
which can also be characterized as the mean level of Keogh partici-
pation by sole proprietors, is shown in Table 9. Farming once again
fell below the mean level of all participants at all income brackets
and for nontaxable returns, while mining and services participated
at the highest levels. This is to be expected, in light of the relative
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Table 9. Mean amount of self-employment retirement deduction*
per Keogh return, by industry, for various income levels.
Total AGI AGI AGI AGI AGI Non-
taxable less than $10,000- $17,500- $25,000- $50,000 taxable
returns $10,000 17,499 2 4L9 9 9  49,999 or more returns
Farms $ 950 $ 380 $ 790 $1,140 $1,930 $2,320 $ 340
Other agriculture,
forestry & fisheries 1,260 290 800 1,680 2,070 2,480 0
Mining 1,900 0 1,290 1,720 1,640 2,250 2,500
General construction 840 540 750 1,140 1,900 2,220 280
Manufacturing 1,320 620 1,120 1,380 1,920 2,150 500
Transportation 790 400 810 920 2,270 1,030 600
Wholesale & retail
trade 1,200 520 820 1,350 1,960 2,310 1,460
Finance, insurance
& real estate 1,350 710 880 1,430 1,790 2,160 1,600
Services 1,790 540 850 1,460 2,090 2,430 690
All industries 1,550 510 840 1,410 2,050 2,410 640
*Rounded to nearest ten dollars.
mean AGI and TI reported by these industries and discussed supra.50
With the exception of the transportation industry (at the highest
AGI class) 51 all industries observed higher absolute mean partici-
pation levels with increasing income.
Table 10 contains the share ratios of the amount of self-employ-
ment deduction claimed by industry, for Keogh participants. The ob-
servations for farms and services were again contrasting in nature,
with farms claiming less than their proportionate share of the Keogh
Table 10. Share ratios for self-employment retirement deduction, by
industry and income level.
Total AGI AGI AGI AGI AGI Non-
taxable less than $10,000- $17,500- $25,000- $50,000 taxable
returns $10,000 17,499 24 999 49,999 or more returns
Farms .62 .75 .94 .81 .94 .96 .53
Other agriculture,
forestry & fisheries .82 .57 .96 1.19 1.01 1.03 0.0
Mining 1.23 0.0 1.54 1.22 .80 .93 3.90
General construction .515 1.07 .90 .81 .93 .89 .78
Manufacturing .85 1.23 1.34 .98 .94 .89 .78
Transportation .51 .78 .97 .65 1.11 .43 .94
Wholesale &
retail trade .77 1.03 .98 .96 .96 .96 2.28
Finance, insurance
& real estate .87 1.40 1.06 1.01 .87 .90 2.50
Services 1.16 1.07 1.02 1.04 1.02 1.01 1.08
50. Whether services, for example, participated at a greater rate than farmers cannot be
determined without looking at earned income, since the maximum allowable Keogh contri-
bution Is based on same (rather than on AGI or TI). The study was structured so as to
investigate earned income, but the results were not yet available when this manuscript was
being written.
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deduction at all income levels while services had a share ratio ex-
ceeding one at all levels. Thus, it is clear that farmers participated
both at a lower rate and at a lower level than did taxpayers in the
services industry.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Since 1963, sole proprietor taxpayers have had the opportunity
to shield a portion of their income from taxation while building up
a reserve for retirement. In essence, the government has offered a
subsidy as an inducement for sole proprietors to create and partici-
pate in Keogh retirement plans.
This study indicates that, in 1968, less than three per cent of all
taxpayers eligible to participate in Keogh were actually doing so.
Another report,52 though analyzing only taxable returns, indicates
that while the proportion of taxpayers participating has increased
over time, those participating now are probably not more than ten
per cent of those eligible. Interestingly, that same report estimated
that those participating in 1966, 1967, 1968 and 1970, respectively,
constituted 1, 2, 4, and 8 per cent of the sole proprietor taxable re-
turns for those years. 53
As compared to the means of total returns for all industries, it
is clear that farmers availed themselves of the Keogh subsidy at
both lower participation rates and levels. Since there was little dif-
ference in family size, as indicated by the number of exemptions
claimed, among farms and the means for all industries, the hypo-
thesis that farmers needed more income for current family consump-
tion would not appear supportable.
Other hypotheses can be posited for the relatively low participa-
tion rates and levels by farmers. One is that the capital require-
ments of the farm business are greater than those of some industries
(e.g., services), and that farmers therefore must earmark a larger
proportion of their cash flow for debt retirement. If so, this is a
rational course of conduct so long as the long-run after-tax returns
of the farm business equal or exceed the long-run after-tax returns
of Keogh participation, considering both the credit and tax subsidy
benefits of Keogh participation. In this respect, economists and other
business analysts can be helpful in assisting farmers and other sole
proprietors in evaluating the economic rationality of Keogh partici-
pation.
A second logically tenable hypothesis explaining why farmers
51. This observation is perhaps, rationalized by the fact that only .11 of one percent of
the Keogh returns filed in this income bracket were filed in the transportation industry.
52. RESEARCH AND STATISTICS NOTE: RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS CLAIMED BY THE SELF-
EMPLOYED, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PUB. No. 73-11701 (Sept. 1972).
53. Id. at 6. This report did not look at participation rates in individual industries.
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contribute to Keogh at relatively low rates and levels is simply that
they do not know of its existence and availability. Logically, the
services industry, with the highest participation rate, has more per-
fect knowledge about Keogh because attorneys and accountants are
a part of its composition. The disparagement between participation
rates and levels for farms and services tends to support the hypo-
thesis about the state of Keogh knowledge among farmers. To the
extent this hypotheses is true, and to the extent it is economically
rational for given farmers to participate, when counseling their farm
clients about financial or estate planning matters, attorneys can pro-
vide them with a valuable service simply by pointing out'the availa-
bility of Keogh and helping them determine whether it would assist
them in meeting long-run personal and business objectives.
Finally, while the analysis in this study was directed primarily
at farmers, it is clear that many sole proprietors in the services
industry believe the Keogh subsidy is beneficial in meeting their
personal and investment objectives. Thus, it is submitted that the
self-employed attorney-reader should evaluate Keogh in light of his
own personal circumstances.

